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Abstract
Monitoring users on large computing platforms such as
high performance computing (HPC) and cloud comput-
ing systems is non-trivial. Utilities such as process view-
ers provide limited insight into what users are running,
due to granularity limitation, and other sources of data,
such as system call tracing, can impose significant oper-
ational overhead. However, despite technical and proce-
dural measures, instances of users abusing valuable HPC
resources for personal gains have been documented in
the past [43], and systems that are open to large numbers
of loosely-verified users from around the world are at risk
of abuse. In this paper, we show how electrical power
consumption data from an HPC platform can be used to
identify what programs are executed. The intuition is
that during execution, programs exhibit various patterns
of CPU and memory activity. These patterns are reflected
in the power consumption of the system and can be used
to identify programs running. We test our approach on
an HPC rack at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
using a variety of scientific benchmarks. Among other
interesting observations, our results show that by moni-
toring the power consumption of an HPC rack, it is pos-
sible to identify if particular programs are running with
precision up to 97% and recall of 95% even in noisy sce-
narios.
1 Introduction
High performance computing (HPC) platforms — ex-
tremely large-scale computation, with an array of
specialized components, optimized for large scale-
simulation and data analysis — are indispensable,
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nation-scale resources. HPC platforms enable exciting
and innovative insight through their ability to process
massive amounts of data. However, these valuable re-
sources come at a high cost. Aside from the cost of the
hardware, there are also high operational costs; annual
energy costs can easily rise to a few million U.S. dollars.
Such high costs elevate the pressure for these platforms
to run as efficiently as possible. These conditions and
problems also apply to other large computation facilities
such as those offered by cloud computing platforms.
Achieving efficiency is a non-trivial, multi-faceted
problem. One aspect of efficiency focuses on design-
ing new hardware architecture and building new com-
ponents that consume less power, radiate less heat, and
can perform tasks faster. Efficiency is also considered at
the software level. For example, considerable research
efforts are spent on developing efficient job scheduling
algorithms that aim for optimal arrangement of program
executions. Previous efforts have also characterized pro-
gram executions in order to identify bottlenecks and peri-
ods of high computational intensity, information that can
provide assistance to scheduling or optimization tech-
niques. An often-forgotten aspect of efficiency focuses
on the users. Misuse and abuse of systems translates to
inefficiency. Consequently, in HPC environments, guar-
anteeing that users utilize these precious resources as in-
tended (often for scientific purposes) is of high impor-
tance [35].
However, monitoring HPC systems and their users is
non-trivial. Despite the wide range of utilities available,
identifying what the users are doing or what programs
are running is difficult. Summary statistics of CPU and
memory provided by HPC systems after jobs complete
provide useful information but limited insight into the
applications running on the HPC system. These sum-
maries typically include aggregated resource utilization
data making it difficult to create unique fingerprints for
individual applications. While time series information
about CPU and memory would be equally informative,
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the collection of this information, especially with high
resolution is intrusive and imposes significant overhead
on the systems. “Job logs” produced by batch scheduling
systems can be extremely valuable, but more often than
not, such logs only record the application name, which is
not always descriptive and useful (“a.out”).
Most institutions that run computational facilities also
take procedural measures for controlling access and ca-
pabilities of users on HPC platforms. In most cases, there
is a well-defined process for obtaining access. In closed
environments, users are typically highly-vetted employ-
ees. In “open,” scientific environments such as those
sponsored by the U.S. National Science Foundation and
the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Science, users
may be less well known, but a still-rigorous, formal ap-
plication process is involved. As part of the application
process, users are expected to list the programs they an-
ticipate using for their experiments, and user agreements
typically legally constrain the behavior of users. In order
to validate user behavior and whether users are adhering
to their agreements, source code can be analyzed stati-
cally and binaries analyzed at runtime. However, static
analysis techniques for such analysis are typically signif-
icantly incomplete at best, often also requiring runtime
analysis as well, and computationally intractable [27] at
worst. In addition, runtime analysis techniques impose
significant performance overhead. Both such efforts are
challenging, time consuming, and impose significant op-
erational burden.
Despite both technical and procedural measures, user
agreement breaches occur. For example, in 2014, re-
searchers were caught mining electronic currency using
a HPC platform owned and operated by the National Sci-
ence Foundation [43]. However, this was neither the first,
nor last such incident that has or might occur, given the
special capabilities of national high-performance com-
puting resources. It is no surprise, therefore, that “se-
curity” is a stated goal of the National Strategic Com-
puting Initiative (NSCI) [1] and has been further exam-
ined in Department of Energy Office of Science con-
texts [36, 37], among others.
Our Work In this paper, we present a “non-intrusive”
method for identification high performance computing
platform activity without reducing performance of the
HPC system under monitoring. Our method leverages
side-channel information “leaked” by the HPC system,
specifically, the electrical power consumption of the rack
during different computational jobs. Our approach uses
random forest algorithm to learn the power consumption
behavior of various programs and uses the learned model
to identify jobs whose behavior deviate from those, in-
dicative of unexpected, potentially illicit computational
tasks.
Threat Model The approach presented in this paper is
intended for use by HPC system administrators in order
to identify potential misuses of HPC resources. While
previously proposed power analysis methods may yield
more accurate results, our method is designed to be non-
intrusive and does not require any modifications to the
system. In fact, our approach can be applied to a sys-
tem in minutes (excluding the training phase). This
paper does not specifically analyze adversarial settings.
Specifically, we do not directly consider scenarios un-
der which a malicious user consciously applies evasive
counter measures to avoid detection. As with any se-
curity scenario, such “masquerade attacks” are possible,
and a variety of techniques exist to counteract such at-
tacks. However, these methods are outside the scope of
this paper.
Evaluation We evaluate the effectiveness of our mon-
itoring method by testing it on an HPC platform at the
National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center,
at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, using a test
suite comprised of the NAS Parallel and NERSC Trinity
Procurement benchmarks. We apply our method to vari-
ous conditions, especially varying levels of “noise” (i.e.,
number of programs/jobs running on the rack). We deter-
mine that most programs can be identified with precision
and recall as high as 90% when only one program is run-
ning on the HPC rack. We also show that programs can
also be identified in the presence of noise, with modest
precision and recall, depending on the program and the
noise level. For “noisy” experiments, we compare our
results using two baselines, random guess (lower bound)
and mutual information (upper bound) and show that our
classification closely follows the theoretic upper bound
computed using mutual information.
We note up front that that our technique is different
than many traditional intrusion detection papers leverag-
ing anomaly detection in two ways: first, we reiterate
that our work to date does not consider adversarial set-
tings — as with all detection schemes, particularly those
based on statistical analyses, there may well be ways for
an attacker to “fool” this technique into the classifier mis-
labeling a program — eliminating all such opportunity is
outside the scope of this paper, which is focused on a
novel detection technique in an environment that is not
typically studied. Second, our technique of analyzing a
relatively small corpus of known-good programs – which
do not change a great deal over time – for significant
deviations from normal, is also very different than typ-
ical applications of anomaly detection to analyzing IP
network traffic or sequences of system calls. Our tech-
nique and application is closer in spirit to specification-
based intrusion detection [19], whereas anomaly detec-
tion against typical network and host data is more reflec-
tive of outlier detection [40] and can suffer considerably
from the base-rate fallacy [4].
As with many approaches that rely on machine learn-
ing, the identification accuracy of our approach depends
on the corpus used during training (in terms of both pro-
grams and configurations). For example, compile-time
configurations may impact the program behavior, lead-
ing to misdetection. Given the large space of possibilities
for training data, it is unrealistic to achieve full coverage.
It is important to note however that most scientific pro-
grams have well-defined compilation process, resulting
in only a handful of variations. Furthermore, many high
performance computing centers, including the one used
in our experiments, have pre-compiled versions of popu-
lar scientific applications that are often used by users.
Contributions To summarize, this paper’s contribu-
tions are as follows:
• A novel non-intrusive method for identifying pro-
grams running on an HPC platform
• A detailed experimental analysis of HPC power us-
age patterns
• Results from applying our method to a production
HPC rack at Lawrence Berkeley National Labora-
tory
• Comparison of classification results with theoretical
upper bound computed using information theoretic
metrics
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we give an overview of related previous efforts.
Section 3 explains the components used in our experi-
ments. Section 4 discusses the methods used in our ex-
periments. Section 5 presents the results of our approach
for identifying programs on HPC platforms. Section 6
presents an analysis of the results as well as limitations
of the approach presented in this paper. Finally, we con-
clude with Section 8 where potential future work is dis-
cussed.
2 Related Work
2.1 Side Channels
Side channels have been studied widely. Previous re-
search efforts primarily exploit side channels to break
systems or infringe on the privacy of users. For exam-
ple, previous research exploits various side channels, in-
cluding power, to recover secret cryptographic keys [20,
26, 24]. Other examples include leveraging side channel
information like encrypted network traffic to infer users’
web browsing activity [18, 8, 6, 13, 22, 42, 12, 32].
While previous work demonstrates that side chan-
nels leak information regarding system activity, previous
analyses focus on the information flow between the input
to a particular system (e.g., cryptographic algorithm, web
browser) and the side channel information (e.g., power,
encrypted network traffic). Recently, researchers began
exploiting the observation that side channels leak control
flow information, and the patterns in side channel infor-
mation can serve as identifying fingerprints for programs
running on a system. For example, researchers study the
use of EM and RF emanations to infer underlying algo-
rithms of programs [38] as well as deviations in program
execution [30]. Our work is similar in that it aims to
identify programs executed. However, our approach is
specifically for HPC environments.
2.2 Power Analysis
Electrical power was one of the earliest side channels
identified. Kocher et. al., [20] introduce differential
power analysis and describe specific methods for ana-
lyzing power consumption measurements to infer secret
keys from cryptographic devices. Similar to Kocher’s
work, Carmeli et. al., [7] take advantage of bugs in hard-
ware and power consumption of a device to analyze its
operations at various stages and retrieve sensitive infor-
mation. Power consumption has also been exploited for
a variety of other purposes including the identification
of Trojans in integrated circuits [2] and exposing a wide
spectrum of system-level host information in container
clouds [10].
Other efforts study the impact of power analysis side
channel attacks from a theoretical point of view. Micali
et. al., [28], build a comprehensive but general model
for defining and delivering cryptographic security in the
presence of side channel attacks. Standaert et al., [41]
build upon this work and evaluate the effect of physical
leakages with a combination of security and information
theoretic measurements.
2.3 Non-intrusive Load Monitoring
Power analysis has also been applied to solving problems
regarding the power grid. This area of research became
known as non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) and it
describes methods for generating “fingerprints” for vari-
ous electric loads in a given household. One of the ear-
liest published efforts is that of Hart et. al. [11] who
apply signal processing techniques on power consump-
tion data of a household to estimate the number and na-
ture of the individual loads within the household. The
authors introduce the switch continuity principle which
states that “in a small time interval, [...] only a small
number of appliances change state in a typical load” and
build their NILM algorithm based on this principle. In
their work, the authors show that it is possible to de-
termine which appliance is turned on (or off) or in use,
given prior knowledge of the appliance models.
Non-intrusive load monitoring shares many similari-
ties with HPC power monitoring. Instead of measuring
the power consumption of households to identify appli-
ances, we monitor HPC rack power consumption in or-
der to determine the what programs are running. How-
ever, it is important to note that there are also some sig-
nificant differences. Appliances have a small number
of states that, in most cases, last for extended periods
of times (e.g., light turned on, refrigerator cooling, dish
washer/laundry machine cycle). For most appliances,
the changes in states impose indicative changes in power
consumption. On the other hand, the behavior of pro-
grams is considerably more dynamic. Considering the
high operating frequency, modern CPUs can exhibit very
short-lasting changes in behavior.
2.4 High Performance Computing
Power consumptions and other side channel information,
such as I/O behavior, has also been studied for their po-
tential in characterizing the behavior of various applica-
tions, especially in HPC settings. However, the over-
whelming majority of these efforts aim to identify phases
or bottlenecks in applications and leverage this informa-
tion to improve the efficiency of HPC platforms. For ex-
ample, Isci et. al. [15] present a method for identify-
ing phases in program power behavior and determining
points in the execution of the program that correspond to
such phases. Using their approach, it is possible to gen-
erate a power vector that represents the estimated power
values for 22 processor components such as trace cache
and integer execution unit. This information can be used
to dynamically scale the frequency of the processor.
For example, Liu et. al. [23] present an approach
for reliably estimating the user-applications’ bandwidth
needs, information that can be used to optimize the
scheduling of jobs on the HPC platform. Similarly, Luu
et. al. [25] analyze the I/O behavior of applications
across multiple runs on an HPC platform and analyze
the evolution of applications across time and across plat-
forms.
Our literature search resulted in only a small amount
of closely-related work. In [14], the authors apply clus-
tering techniques on HPC power data to fingerprint appli-
cations. The authors rely on six time domain features and
demonstrate that such features are enough to differenti-
ate between the ten programs used for testing. However,
the authors assume the power traces obtained represent
the execution of a single program (i.e., there is no noise
or multiple programs executed in parallel). In our work,
we measure the power consumed by an entire rack of
HPC nodes and make no assumptions about the number
of programs represented in the power trace. The differ-
ences in our work also have implications with respect
to feasibility. Specifically, while their approach requires
a single power meter per node, our approach can iden-
tify programs running on an entire rack using only one
power sensor. Previous studies indicate that single node
jobs compose somewhere between 2% [17] and 20% of
the workloads [39].
Peisert [34] and Whalen et. al. [45, 46] exploit pat-
terns in Message Passing Interface (MPI) function calls
to classify applications by their computation type. While
their effort focuses on characterizing HPC workload, our
work aims to identify programs running on an HPC plat-
form at a given time.
3 Experimental Setup
Below we discuss the components used in our experi-
ments, with respect to both hardware and software.
3.1 Sensors
Power measurements are collected using a micro-phasor
measurement unit (µPMU) [21]. The µPMU we use is a
device much like PMUs typically used on the transmis-
sion grid, but is designed specifically for the distribution
grid. The µPMUs we use sample electrical current, volt-
age, and neutral phase angles for all three phases at 512
samples per cycle, 60 cycles per second. This data is
recorded as root-mean-squared values at 120 Hertz after
phasor conversion. The sensor is placed in-line with the
target device. In our experiment, the sensor is in-line
with a power distribution unit (PDU), which provides
power to the HPC rack used in our experiments.
3.2 HPC Test Platform
For our experiments, we monitor one of the production
compute platform racks at Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory. The rack consists of 36 Condo compute
nodes. Each node is equipped with quad-core Intel Xeon
E5530 processors and 24 GB of random access memory.
The nodes are inter-connected using QDR InfiniBand, a
well-established computer-networking communications
standard for HPC platforms. However, the nodes we are
monitoring do not contain physical storage drives; stor-
age is contained in a separate set of racks.
The power consumption data measured by the µPMU
reflects the work performed by all 36 nodes housed in
the monitored rack. In addition, we wish to highlight
that the scheduling system is designed such that at any
given time, only one application can run on a particular
node. However, the application may consist of multiple
processes or threads.
3.3 Test Programs
In our experiments, we wish to replicate a production
HPC environment as much as possible. To this extent,
for our application test suite, we choose benchmarks de-
signed to mimic the behavior of scientific applications.
Specifically, we rely on two benchmark suites: NAS Par-
allel [5] benchmarks and the NERSC-8 Trinity procure-
ment [31] benchmarks.
The NPB are a small set of programs, derived from
computational fluid dynamics applications, designed to
evaluate the performance of parallel supercomputers.
These benchmarks implement scientific computations,
similar to codes that are usually executed by scientists.
Specifically, the benchmarks used in our analysis repre-
sent an block tri-diagonal (BT) solver, conjugate gradient
(CG) program, embarrassingly parallel (EP) code, fast
Fourier transform (FT) kernel, integer sort (IS) program,
scalar penta-diagonal (SP) solver, lower-upper Gauss-
Seidel (LU) solver, and a multi-grid (MG) application.
The NPB define eight problem size classes (i.e., S, W,
A, B, C, D, E, F in increasing order of complexity). The
problem size class defines the input and parameters used
during execution and consequently adjust the complexity
of the computation. For example, class S is for small-
scale experiments, while class W is for workstation size
and class F represents the largest test problems. In our
experiments, we compile the codes of version 3.3.1 for
problem size class C and D (for the CG, EP, IS, and MG
programs). We use two problem size classes in attempts
to increase the runtime duration of some benchmarks.
For example, one of the benchmarks, the Integer Sort
(IS) program runs for less than 10 seconds at problem
size class C. Unfortunately, the runtime duration is only
slightly increased at problem size class D. At the time of
this writing, there are twelve benchmarks total, eight of
which we use in our analysis. Four of the benchmarks
are eliminated because they either are not available for
larger problem sizes or are designed to test I/O perfor-
mance, which is not visible to our power sensors, since
they have visibility only to CPU racks. Consequently,
the NAS parallel benchmarks used in these experiments
are: BT, CG, EP, FT, IS, LU, MG, and SP.
The NERSC-8 Trinity Procurement benchmarks are
a set of programs created by the National Energy Re-
search Scientific Computing Center (NERSC). NERSC
designed this set of mini-applications to mimic the be-
havior of real applications and uses these benchmarks
for system evaluation and acceptance testing. We use
4 Trinity programs in our analysis: a parallel algebraic
multi-grid solver for linear systems (AMG), 3D Gyro-
kinetic Toroidal code (GTC), finite element generation,
assembly and solution code (MINIFE), neutral particle
transport application (SNAP).
For each program, we gather 50 samples by running
each program independently multiple times. Since these
applications are designed as benchmarks, the input is
constant between runs.
We note that while the corpus appears small, in many
HPC environments, it is usually the case that a small
number of applications (between 10-50) compose the
majority of the workload (between 60-80%) [17, 39, 3].
While our corpus is composed of benchmark codes, these
codes implement common algorithms as characterized
by Colella’s seven dwarfs and are highly representative
of HPC workloads [17].
4 Methodology
4.1 Data Collection
We gather electrical current magnitude time series sam-
ples for each program by executing it independently mul-
tiple times on our test HPC rack. In total, we have
50 samples per program. We refer to these samples as
“clean” samples since only one program is executed on
the monitored rack at a time. Figure 1 depicts raw elec-
trical current magnitude time series samples for all pro-
grams. Several observations can be made from the figure.
First it is important to note that the NAS Parallel bench-
marks impose an average consumption of 27 Amps. On
the other hand, the NERSC-8 Trinity Procurement pro-
grams impose a much higher load which causes the sys-
tem to draw more current. Furthermore, we can see that
while some programs exhibit (visually) distinct patterns,
other programs such as CG and EP do not and are rela-
tively similar.
In production HPC environments, it is rare that a sin-
gle job is executing on any given rack. To replicate
such “noisy” environments, we combine “clean” pro-
gram samples to synthetically generate “noisy” samples.
In particular, to generate a “noisy” sample for program
Ptarget , we first select a sample for program Ptarget that
will serve as the target sample. Noise is added by ran-
domly selecting a “noise program” Pnoise from the pool
of available programs. We make sure the “noise pro-
gram” Pnoise is not the same class type as the target sam-
ple. Next, we randomly select a “noise program sample”
and add it to the target sample, starting at a randomly se-
lected index. Randomness is introduced to replicate the
unpredictable changes in the work load of an HPC rack.
We choose to generate synthetic noisy samples as op-
posed to actually running multiple programs in parallel
for two reasons. First it allows us to generate signifi-
cantly more combinations of samples faster and a wider
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Figure 1: Diagram visualizing the raw current magnitude time series for all programs.
variety of “noisy” conditions. Additionally, it avoids
spending costly cycles on the HPC platform. We note
that this technique was designed from the outset to be
realistic by working in partnership with operational staff
at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Those staff
confirm the validity of the approach assuming the num-
ber and type of components (compute nodes, network
routers, service nodes, etc...) for any given rack being
monitored is roughly the same, which is the case for typ-
ical HPC centers.
The synthetic noisy samples generated are equivalent
to a sample obtained by actually running the program
concurrently. Any new job is assigned to one or more
idle node(s). Given that electrical power of individual
circuits is additive (regardless of configuration), the sum
of the power of individual circuits is equal to the power
of the combined circuits. In other words, the sum of
the power consumption of individual nodes is equal the
power consumption of multiple nodes. Previous work
in the area of non-intrusive load monitoring uses similar
techniques [29, 47].
4.2 Feature Selection
To facilitate the generation of “fingerprints” or each pro-
gram, we first extract a variety of features to describe
the samples. Specifically, we rely on both time and fre-
quency domain features. Time domain features capture
temporal information that is not captured by frequency
analysis. However, unlike time domain features, fre-
quency domain features are less impacted by noise.T
Therefore, we rely on both time and frequency domain
features to capture as much information and to better dis-
tinguish between signals.
Selecting time domain features is non-trivial. The
well-known Anscombe’s quartet elegantly describes the
challenge. Specifically, Anscombe’s quartet presents
four data sets that share statistical metrics, some of which
are identical (i.e., mean, variance) while others are ex-
tremely close. In our problem setting, noise refers to
the fact that the amount of current consumption, as mea-
sured, is a holistic representation of the system’s activity.
In other words, the current magnitude time series reflects
all of the jobs running across all nodes of the monitored
rack. To establish a representative set of time domain
features, we compare their distribution across all sam-
ples from all of the programs. The following features
represent the final set of time domain features: maximum
value, percentiles, auto-correlation coefficients with dif-
ferent lag values, standard deviation, empirical cumula-
tive distribution function, stationary coefficient, discrim-
inant function analysis, absolute energy, and ratio of vari-
ance to standard deviation.
For feature extraction, we focus on three types of fre-
quency analysis: discrete Fourier transform, power spec-
tral density, and wavelet analysis. In comparison with
discrete Fourier transformation, power spectral density
estimates the power of various frequency components of
a signal. To compute power spectral density, we apply
Welch’s method [44] to each sample. We use the imple-
mentation found in the SciPy [16] Python library (ver-
sion 0.18.1). Welch’s method is used to estimate the
power of a signal at different frequencies and it does
this by performing windowed short term discrete Fourier
transform. Instead of using the raw power spectral den-
sity values, we extract the top four peak values (both fre-
quency and corresponding power spectral density).
Fourier transform intrinsically compromises time and
frequency resolutions and is restricted to decomposing a
signal into sinusoids. To combat these limitations, we
also perform wavelet analysis. To perform wavelet trans-
formation, we leverage the Ricker wavelet function. We
use the implementation found in the SciPy [16] Python
library (version 0.18.1). For our features, we extract
coefficients with different width values for the wavelet
function. Ultimately, for our classification, we rely solely
on wavelet coefficients.
As mentioned above, feature selection is a meticulous
process that requires a lot of experimenting and finesse.
The final features are selected using two types of analy-
sis. First, we perform distribution and variance analysis
of the feature values across the different samples in or-
der to identify and remove features with values shared
by many types of programs. We also use Gini impurity
to determine how each feature contributes to the label-
ing of a sample. Gini impurity is a method used during
the building of decision trees to measure the prediction
power of the features. Gini impurity aims to measure
the homogeneity of features and it does this by estimat-
ing how likely it is to mis-label a sample if the label is
assigned randomly according to the distribution of the la-
bels determined by the feature. When a feature is able to
narrow down the label to only one option, its Gini index
is 0. When there are multiple labels and the probabil-
ity associated with each label is the same, the index is
one. Therefore, features with low index values are more
valuable in classifying data.
After thorough examination of the features and several
experiments, we converged on a set of 24 total feature
values.1
4.3 Analysis
There are several ways to process the samples. One
method is to extract features for each sample and as-
sign the corresponding label. However, such strategy can
have several negative effects. As described above, con-
sidering entire samples when computing certain features
can result in information loss (refer to the mention of
Anscombe’s quartet above). In addition, the results of
certain frequency domain transformations depend on the
length of the sample and are impacted when the samples
vary in duration. In our experiments, the runtime du-
ration of programs varies not only across programs but
even for the same program.
In addition, we believe the Hart’s switch continuity
principle also applies to this setting. Specifically, when
considering short windows, only a small number of pro-
grams are expected to exhibit significant changes. Con-
sequently, our method divides each sample into equal
length windows. Each window is preprocessed (e.g., nor-
malized) after which features are extracted. To intro-
duce time-dependency information, we group consecu-
tive windows together into “window groups.” Each “win-
dow group” represents a single feature vector (used in
classification). In other words, a feature vector is com-
posed of sets of feature values, one set per window.
1some features (e.g., percentiles, wavelet coefficients) have multiple
feature values
Relying on windows also has other benefits, specifi-
cally with respect to the program input. The behavior
of computational programs is usually split between three
phases: input reading (denoted as I), processing (denoted
as P), and output writing (denoted as O). While the size
and type of input may vary, the behavior during the three
phases is similar. If the window size is carefully selected,
breaking the power signal sample into windows means
that our approach makes no assumption about duration
(or even number or order of windows) for each of the
three phase for a given program run. Using the denoa-
tion from above, our approach can successfully identify
executions of program X whether the behavior is repre-
sented by IIIPPPOOO or IPO or even IPOIPOIP.
We experimented with several window sizes, window
group sizes, as well as various overlap strategies (i.e.,
where window groups share overlapping windows). Our
experiments show that classification is most accurate
when using 2 second windows (i.e., 240 data points at
120 Hz) and window groups of size 4. However, the
variations in classification results due to window sizes
and window group sizes are relatively small. We observe
no significant improvement when overlapping window
groups and consequently choose to not implement any
such strategy.
4.4 Building Program Fingerprints
We apply machine learning to generate fingerprints for
each program using the feature vectors constructed as
described above. Specifically, we rely on a random for-
est algorithm. A random forest is an ensemble learning
algorithm often used for multi-class classification. The
random forests are constructed during the training phase.
Specifically, to grow a random forest, subsets of features
are selected (with replacement) and decisions trees are
created for each feature subset. The label of the target
sample is determined by the mode of the decision tree
predictions. Unlike decision trees, which are very sus-
ceptible to over-fitting, random forests reduce the bias by
using a bagging process. Bagging occurs at two levels:
data selection and variable selection. Using bagging, the
construction of each tree uses a different subset of data
and as well as a different subset of variables. For our ex-
periments, we use the scikit-learn [33] (version 0.17.1)
Python machine learning library for both the random for-
est implementation as well as supporting tools.
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of our experiments.
As mentioned earlier, we reiterate that neither our ap-
proach nor our target environment, and therefore also our
results, should be compared directly with typical applica-
tions of anomaly detection, as our technique of analyz-
ing a relatively small corpus of known-good programs
that do not change a great deal over time is very different
than common applications of anomaly detection, which
are more reflective of outlier detection, and suffer con-
siderably from the base-rate fallacy.
We present the results of identifying programs in both
clean (i.e., noise = 0, target program is the only program
running) and noisy experiments (i.e., noise≥ 1). In total,
we run 8 trials for each experiment (i.e., noise level) and
each experiment performs 3-fold cross validation. The
results of the 3-fold cross validations are verified for sta-
tistical significance using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
(WMW) signed ranked test (p < 0.01) for the clean clas-
sification experiments. Unlike the t-test, the Wilcoxon
signed rank test does not assume that the data are sam-
pled from a Gaussian distribution.
Some programs were excluded from the experiments
because the samples are too short in length. For example,
the execution for the SNAP program takes only twelve
seconds. Such short runtime duration is not enough to
compose even two feature vectors of four windows of
two seconds each. We filter out samples (consequently
programs) with length shorter than 32 seconds. However,
we wish to point out that the window size and window
group size can be adjusted as seen fit.
5.1 Clean classification
Program Precision (%) Recall (%) F Score
BT 93.55 97.04 0.95
CG 50.0 3.32 0.06
EP 51.11 76.17 0.50
FT – – –
IS 17.04 100.0 0.28
LU 89.18 100.0 0.94
MG 100.0 54.50 0.70
SP 94.30 84.03 0.89
AMG 100.0 100.0 1.0
GTC 100.0 100.0 1.0
MINIFE 100.0 100.0 1.0
SNAP – – –
Table 1: Our approach achieves high precision and recall
for most programs. Manual analysis of the results show
that BT, CG, and EP are often misclassified as each other.
Table 5.1 describes the results of the clean experi-
ments. Specifically, the classification precision, recall,
and F-beta scores are listed for each program. Precision,
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Figure 2: While noise (i.e., multiple concurrent jobs) does impact the average classification accuracy of our approach,
the impact mirrors the loss in the theoretical mutual information.
or true positive rate, is defined by:
precision =
true positives
(true positives+ f alse positives)
Precision describes the ability of the classifier to only
identify samples that belong to the target sample. Recall,
also known as sensitivity, is defined by:
recall =
true positives
(true positives+ f alse negatives)
Recall represents the fraction of relevant entities that
have been identified over the total number of relevant
samples. F-beta score (F-score for short) is a value be-
tween 0 and 1 that represents the harmonic mean be-
tween precision and recall. In our case, precision and
recall are weighted equally in the calculation of the F-
score.
Our method is capable of identifying many of the pro-
grams with high precision and recall. 6 of the 10 pro-
grams are identified with an F score of over 85%. How-
ever, the classification of three programs (i.e., CG, EP,
and IS) is considerably less accurate.
5.2 Noisy classification
As previously mentioned, in most production HPC envi-
ronments, it is rarely the case that only one program (or
job) is running on a given rack. Consequently, we test our
approach on multiple noise levels. The noise level repre-
sents the number of samples (of other classes/programs)
used to generate the noisy synthetic sample. For exam-
ple, a noise level of one means that the target program
sample was mixed with one other sample of a randomly
selected sample. It is important to note that the class type
of the sample used as “noise” is different from the target
sample class type.
Figure 2 visualizes the impact of noise on the average
accuracy of our classification. We present two compari-
son baselines for our results.
As a theoretical lower bound, we compare the classi-
fication results with a random guess strategy, where the
label of each window is randomly selected from the pool
of available programs. Given the randomly guessed win-
dow labels, the sample label is again selected by picking
the label with the highest count. The accuracy of the ran-
dom guess strategy is visualized in a green dotted line.
The expected value of the average accuracy of randomly
guessing is:
E[rand guess] =
1
num programs
In our case this is equal to 18 . Naturally, the accuracy of
random guessing is unaffected by noise.
In contrast, we estimate the theoretical upper limit of
such classification using mutual information, represented
by a green dashed line. The mutual information of two
samples is an information theoretic measure of the mu-
tual dependence between the two samples. Specifically,
mutual information computes the conditional Shannon
entropy of one sample based on the second sample. In
our work, we use the mutual information as a way to es-
timate the information lost by the addition of noise to a
sample. As such, for each sample used for classification,
we compute the mutual information between the origi-
nal sample and the corresponding synthetic noisy sam-
ple. As expected, in our experiments, the mutual infor-
mation varies depending on the type of sample and the
placement, as well as magnitude, of noise.
As shown in Figure 2, we can see that our classifica-
tion approach performs better than the random guessing
strategy and is within 15-20% of the theoretical upper
bound defined by the mutual information metric. It is im-
portant to note that some of the difference between the
upper bound and our classification results is accounted
by the training error. In other words, two executions
of the same program do not generate perfectly identical
samples. Consequently, the mutual information between
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Figure 3: Noise impacts each program differently depending on (i) the nature of the program and its behavior as
exhibited in the power consumption and (ii) the nature of the noise.
such two samples is often less than one. This is also
reflected in the clean classification results described in
Table 5.1.
Figure 3 depicts the precision and recall results for
each individual program across varying levels of noise.
It is important to note that while both precision and recall
decrease for all programs as the level of noise increases,
the rate of decline varies across the programs. For ex-
ample, several programs, such as MG and MINIFE,
maintain recall scores above 90% despite the increase in
noise. Moreover, programs AMG, MINIFE, and AMG
can be identified with precision above 90% despite the
level of noise. Noise greatly impacts the identification
(both precision and recall) of other programs, such as SP.
In the case of some programs, the performance varies
between two consecutive noise levels. For example, in
the top part of Figure 3, we can see that the recall of the
MG program increases from noise level 2 to 3 and again
between noise levels 4 and 5. This behavior is explained
by the randomness involved in the generation of noisy
synthetic samples. Specifically, our approach randomly
selects the starting location at which noise is added to
the target sample. This can have significant impacts on
classification. In other words, if noise is added from the
beginning of the target sample, more of the window sets
are affected and consequently the overall accuracy de-
creases. On the other hand, if noise is added only in the
last few window sets, it is possible that the previous win-
dow sets are correctly identified and the only misclassi-
fied window sets are those affected by the noise.
6 Discussion
As the results show (see Figure 3), our method performs
well for most programs in noiseless scenarios (i.e., when
the target program is the only program executing on the
HPC rack). However, this is not the case for all pro-
grams. We analyze the results manually to determine
why some of the programs have low scores even in noise-
less scenarios. Our analysis of the confusion matrix
shows that programs EP and CG are often misclassified
as each other. In addition, we see that program IS is iden-
tified with high recall but low precision, signifying that
there is a large number of false positives. This is also
represented in the confusion matrix, which shows that
window sets of most other programs are misclassified as
IS.
On the other hand, the average accuracy of our ap-
proach decreases as the number of programs executed
increases. However, it is important to note that the im-
pact of noise differs across the different programs. For
example, even with 10 other programs running simul-
taneously, the MINIFE program can still be identified
with relatively high precision and recall (93%). This
is explained by the fact that programs such as AMG,
GTCMPI, and MINIFE utilize more resources and con-
sequently exhibit more prominent and dominant patterns
in their electrical current footprint. This is also visibly
apparent in Figure 1. In other words, our method is best
at identifying programs that utilize significant resources
(e.g., number of nodes, CPU cycles).
Another interesting observation is that noise impacts
precision more so than recall. In other words, our ap-
proach produces few false negatives and a higher num-
ber of false positives. Depending on the application, this
may be a desirable effect.
Overall, from the results, it is also evident that our ap-
proach is more successful in identifying programs that
exhibit distinctive patterns in their behavior. For exam-
ple, even amongst the less CPU intensive NPB programs,
the BT program is more accurately identified, which we
believe is explained by the frequency domain pattern the
sample exhibits. On the other hand, our approach strug-
gles with programs such as EP for which the current
magnitude time series is relatively constant and show no
patterns. As previously mentioned, this is also confirmed
by the confusion matrix, specifically the distribution of
false positives.
These observations have several implications when
applying our approach to a real HPC environment. First,
as described above, our approach is more successful
at identifying resource-intensive applications. Conse-
quently, the method described in this paper may not be
able to identify executions of short programs or scripts.
That being said, operators of both high-performance
computing centers and commercial cloud providers have
expressed their primary concern as mis-use of computa-
tion resources for unauthorized purposes. Therefore, it
is the computationally-intensive tasks, which our tech-
nique performs better on, that is more valuable to poten-
tial end users. We also note that most HPC applications
are highly-parallelizable computationaly intensive appli-
cations that often require several nodes to run efficiently,
and so leveraging our technique to identify tasks that are
not using the CPU efficiently is a potentially interest-
ing application. Finally, we also believe in our current
approach the granularity of the power data is a limiting
factor for improved accuracy and that higher-resolution
(more than 120Hz) power data could increase the accu-
racy of our approach and broaden the coverage of our
approach to also include programs with short execution
times or low resource usage.
7 Limitations and Future Work
It is important to note that there are alternative methods
for measuring the system power consumption. For exam-
ple, it is possible to insert probes into the CPU and mea-
sure the power directly. While such alternatives provide
a clearer picture of the CPU activity and may produce
better results, they are also intrusive and less practical.
Introducing probes into the CPUs of every single com-
pute node in every rack is labor-intensive and increases
the overhead of the system maintenance process.
Aside from data collection alternatives, our approach
has a few limitations. Our approach is limited with
respect to identifying HPC activity in noisy scenarios.
Throughout our experiments, we have applied various
noisy filtering techniques, in both time and frequency do-
main, with limited success. Future research is needed to
identify compatible noise filtering and power disaggre-
gation techniques.
Another limitation of our approach lies in the depen-
dency on supervised learning. Specifically, our approach
can only identify the programs the algorithm was trained
on. As discussed earlier, we do not believe this to be a
critical limitation of our approach considering the homo-
geneous nature of most HPC workloads (i.e., few appli-
cations consume majority of cycles [17, 39, 3]).
In the future, we wish to address some of the limi-
tations and improve our approach. First, we are inter-
ested in studying how changes in the compilation settings
(e.g., optimization flags), source code (e.g., different ver-
sions), and input affect the behavior of the applications
as exhibited in the power consumption. Furthermore, we
would like to expand our work to classify HPC activity
into computational classes (similar to [45, 46, 34]), rather
than individual programs. We believe such an approach
would identify what types of applications users are run-
ning on a particular system without explicitly analyzing
and extracting “fingerprints” for every possible applica-
tion. Additionally, by classifying computational classes
rather than individual programs, our approach would be
more robust to changes in the source code, compila-
tion settings, or even input. Additionally, we believe
that higher resolution data could disclose additional pat-
terns depicting the behavior of the programs that could
be leveraged to further differentiate between workloads
and we would like to test our hypothesis with various
power sensors. Other future work includes levearging
other side channel information (e.g., performance hard-
ware counters), combining mutliple side channels to fur-
ther improve classification, as well as applying other ma-
chine learning techniques, such as deep learning.
Finally, we reiterate that our work to date does not con-
sider adversarial settings.
8 Conclusion
High performance computing facilities are national re-
sources, and their availability for legitimate use is lim-
ited. Past incidents have provided evidence that high-
performance computing resources are sometimes abused
by users for personal gain. However, identifying how
those systems are used, by understanding what programs
are running on such systems, is non-trivial and many
monitoring utilities provide limited, if any, insight.
In this paper we present a method for inferring the
activity of HPC users by non-intrusively monitoring the
power consumption of HPC systems and leveraging that
information to identify what programs are running. At
its core, our method leverages the observation that pro-
grams exhibit patterns in CPU and I/O throughout exe-
cution and these patterns are reflected in the power con-
sumption of the HPC node, specifically in the amount of
electrical current drawn by the system.
Specifically, our approach measures the electrical cur-
rent drawn by a HPC rack (of multiple compute nodes)
during the execution of programs and applies machine
learning to generate “fingerprints” for each program and
later identify programs given unknown electrical current
samples.
Our experiments show that the method presented in
this paper is capable of identifying programs with high
precision (97%) and recall (95%) even in noisy sce-
narios, where multiple programs are running simultane-
ously on the same rack. While the average accuracy de-
creases as the number of simultaneously running pro-
grams increases, our method is capable of identifying
large, resource-intensive programs with high precision
and recall. Although the experiments presented in this
paper focus on HPC environments, we believe similar
approach can also be applied in cloud computing plat-
forms, for example to identify when users leverage cloud
computing resources for nefarious purposes such as run-
ning a botnet.
At a broader level, our method demonstrates that side
channel information can be leveraged to accurately deter-
mine what a system is doing. We envision our approach
being used in several ways. As presented in this paper,
we believe our approach could be used by HPC/cloud
system administrators as a first-pass filter towards identi-
fication of potential misuse of resources. This would in-
volve training the model on the common applications and
using it to fingerprint on-going workloads. If a particu-
lar workload is not identified as any of the trained com-
mon applications by our approach, an alert is raised and
manual analysis of the particular code can be performed.
Another benefit of our approach is that it provides an al-
ternative method for workload characterization that can
be applied as the systems are running. Specifically, in-
formation regarding type and duration of workloads can
be valuable for optimizing the HPC systems, particularly
with scheduling.
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